De-energise to trip" is a long established principle because of the danger of common cause failures. Although there is little published on this topic, it is covered in the section "Protection systems (trips and interlocks)" in the HSE Technical Measure Document for COMAH sites, but the quality of UPS, diagnostics etc. is now very different from the last century.
Introduction/background
The concept of identifying a "safe state" for a system is well established in the process and energy industries. A sub-system that will transition a system into a safe state, in the event of a failure, is often called "fail safe" or "fail to safety" sub-system. This is by contrast with sub-systems whose failures lead to a hazard from the system which are called "fail to danger" sub-systems. While we accept that not all hazards result from failures, all hazard analyses should consider the results of power failures -whatever the source of power (electrical, hydraulic, pneumatic, etc.) .
Common examples of sub-systems that transition a system into a safe state are shutdown, emergency shutdown (ESD) or trip systems. Conventionally, these sub-systems have been designed so that, on loss of communication or loss of power, the sub-system will operate or trip and the system will transition into a safe state. However this is not always so; but what determines the basic safety principles? Hence the title of this paper "Energise or De-energise to trip?" Two simple examples, shown in Figures 1 and 2 , are an upper quadrant Semaphore Railway Signal that uses gravity to De-energise to Trip -(DT) -and Electrical Switchgear, which is usually designed as Energise to Trip -(ET).
Both these examples assume a safe state and in many industries this is well defined. For some industries this is more difficult, for example, "fly-by-wire avionics." Apart from when the aircraft is on the ground, there is not a "safe" airborne state for the avionics. System owners and system operators are concerned with issues of finance and reputation as well as safety and environmental issues. Thus unintended operation of trip systems or "spurious" trips is also an issue of concern. Modern technology has resulted in a re-consideration of traditional designs, for example • comprehensive diagnostics allow early detection of many failures including communication failures; • uninterruptible and local power supplies are now much cheaper and more reliable; and • communication protocols provide both error detection and correction Thus many more systems can now include trip subsystems that are: Feature: Energise or De-energise to trip?
• more complex; • energise to trip; and thus • no longer fail-safe However the implications of these changes in design are not always fully appreciated. As well as the obvious effects of architecture, failure modes and frequency on the number of spurious trips and failures to danger, we have also studied the relationships between design policies (for example, overrides and diagnostic coverage), testing policies, repair policies, operating policies and their effects on common cause failures. The effects of different policies on spurious trips and failures to danger are illustrated here with practical examples from the energy industry: oil and gas production and power stations.
Design issues
The traditional view has been that there is a trade off between protecting against hazards to people or the environment and availability (of supply or output) for operation. De-energise to trip has been applied principally when safety has been dominant and energise to trip when the key issue has been availability, particularly availability of primary services such as electric power. Hence electrical switchgear has usually been designed as energise to trip in order to maintain supplies.
However, the reality is much more complex than is suggested by the simple diagram in Figure 3 : Traditional choices, which take no account of the improvements in reliability of sensors, communications, final elements (actuators), power supplies or diagnostics. These are considered below.
As assessors of safety sub-systems, we are sometimes asked by clients, "As we are concerned about spurious trips, would 'energise to trip' be acceptable and under what conditions?" They accept that: 1. inherent safety is better, and that, 2. identifying safe state(s) that can be achieved by a simple trip system using reliable well-proven components is also best, but 3. are concerned that this may lead to an unacceptable number of spurious trips.
They also know that even using de-energise to trip, systematic or common cause failures can also prevent the "safe state" from being achieved, for example a seized cable on the railway semaphore signal, wet instrument air or welded relay contacts.
Available Guidance
The guidance in the references is very relevant but is mainly about fail-safe, safe states and complexity -there is little or no mention of ET and/or DT. The HSE website [1] does mention ET and DT as does "Safety Shutdown Systems Design, Analysis and Justification" by Paul Gruhn and Harry Cheddie [2] but these two references are not as widely known as they might be.
Apart from these two references, very little specific guidance has been published and a simple example of a high-pressure trip illustrates why the traditional choices above are far from obvious and more guidance is needed.
Overpressure protection for a turbine driven compressor
Consider a simple over-pressure protection sub-system for a compressor as illustrated in Figure 4 : High-pressure trip. Pressure transmitter(s) are connected to a logic solver (incorporating a high-pressure trip setting) which is connected to a bypass valve that can open to allow the output of the compressor to be connected back to the input. At the same time, the logic solver can also shut the power supply to the turbine driving the compressor.
So what does DT imply for this simple high-pressure trip subsystem. If the pressure sensor(s) fail they may give a low output; so does DT imply reverse acting transmitters for high-pressure; (and similarly for other highlevel; high-temperature etc. trips)? If the logic solver is implemented in relays then coil and open (o/c) circuit contact failures are typically 90% of the failures, only 10% of the failures are short-circuit (s/c). Hence, DT might give a high-integrity trip system but DT will also result in higher spurious trips if 1oo2 sensors are used as well as the 1oo2 final elements shown. Using 2oo3 sensors will reduce the number of spurious trips from sensor faults, but we have seen DT designs with 3 sensors where the 2oo3 relay voting is badly designed and has single point of failure (SPOF), so that the high-integrity of the 2oo3 design is lost.
In ISA TR84.00.02 Part 1 Page 57 [3] for a solenoid valve in DT mode, the MTTF (danger) is quoted as 100 yrs; MTTF (spurious) is quoted as 10 years; for a solenoid valve in ET mode the MTTF (danger) is quoted as 30 yrs and MTTF (spurious) is quoted as 100 years. Thus it is important to remember that when a manufacturer quotes a SIL rating for a solenoid valve, it will be for the DT mode of operation not the ET mode of operation.
A valve final element may have 60% failures with gas passing internally -no tight shut-off and another 20% of failures where the valve sticks, so even with close on air failure we may have 80% of the failure modes when the valve fails to completely close so, for example, fuel is still supplied to the turbine (this applies equally to ET and to DT). In this example, the fuel valve has to close while the bypass valve has to open.
There are also many more similar important reasons why trip systems may fail.
Why do trip systems fail?
We may have given the impression that the fundamental choice for safety was DT or ET, but there are many other issues. 1. First, and most important, we should be aiming to make systems inherently safe, not starting with an inherently unsafe design and then adding on protection. 2. Secondly DT v. ET is a Specification and Design & Implementation issue, which (based on a sample of 32 incidents) was the primary cause of error in only 27% of incidents (starred (*) items in table) whereas 73% were cause by other issues, as illustrated in Table 1 [4] 
Operation

Safety Availability
De-energise to Trip (DT) Both DT & ET need reliable components but diagnostics are much more important for ET as illustrated in Figure 6 : Effect of diagnostics on system failure modes from "Reliability Prediction Method for Safety Instrument Systems" [5] .
Energise to Trip (ET)
Obviously "fail to danger detected" is only "non-critical" if action is taken immediately.
Emergency feed example
Could we design this emergency supply system as de-energise to trip? If the cause of the loss of flow is an electrical failure then the pumps will be lost and it will not be possible to provide the emergency feed without the pumps. This is a common cause failure, and one that should arguably be designed with energise to trip principles in mind as it is always necessary to look wider than simply the design of the identified SIF. Alternative motive power for one pump by diesel or turbine driven pumps is an option.
Another example of options for addition of Reactor Inhibitor
Inhibition is required quickly when the reaction is "running away" with temperature and pressure in the reactor rising rapidly. Which approach is actually more "safe"; relying on a pump cutting in to inject inhibitor at high-pressure, or using high-pressure nitrogen as the motive power via 2 open-air failure valves?
Architecture and Spurious Trip Frequency
Overcoming availability considerations with de-energise to trip has traditionally been done with redundancy, typically 2oo3 has been necessary to achieve required level of both safety integrity and availability, but full 2oo3 is expensive for final elements. Improvement with 2oo3 will not be this good unless diversity is provided because of common cause issues. See the example of 2oo3 for PTs on Figure  4 : High-pressure trip.
Fault trees for a high-pressure trip One way of considering the differences between ET and DT is to analyse the two different designs using Fault Tree Analysis.
All the subsequent fault trees use the colour coding shown in Figure 9 -Colour coding of fault trees. All the fault trees ignore systematic faults and consider only random hardware failures
Fail to danger fault trees
The DT fault tree is not dependant on diagnostics as shown in Figure  10 : DT high-pressure trip fails to danger, whereas the ET design does depend on diagnostics so these are included in the fault tree shown in Figure 11 : ET high pressure trip fails to danger.
Top event is that the overpressure system fails to danger and will not operate if the pressure goes high.
Sensor failures -black with 2oo3 voting; Logic solver failure event -red; Final element failures -blue 1oo2 hence AND gate as for the overpressure system to fail to danger, both need to fail.
The other 2 events are short circuit (s/c) failures of communications to and from the logic solver (note that s/c failures are usually only 10% of relay failures).
For the ET fault tree the top event shown in Figure 11 is that the overpressure system fails to danger and will not operate if the pressure goes high: Sensor failures -black with 2oo3 voting; Logic solver failure event -red; Final element failures -blue 1oo2 hence. AND gate as for the overpressure system to fail to danger, both need to fail.
The other events are: Even without examining the details of the two different fault trees above for DT and ET, it is immediately apparent that the ET design involves many more issues. This does not mean that an ET design is less reliable, just that there is much more scope for getting it wrong, for example.
Sensors
Logic solver So why is there a great difference in the size and complexity of the diagrams? All the fault trees shown in Figs 10 and 11 consider only random hardware failures. In addition there may be failures caused by systematic faults that are not shown, for example, design errors, lack of configuration control, software bugs. The fault trees expose the added complexity of ET compared to DT. The ET diagrams for failure to trip are larger and more complex than the equivalent diagrams for DT. Thus, as well as more opportunities for random hardware faults to cause ET to fail to trip, there are also more opportunities for systematic errors because of the additional complexity. Above all the extra complexity gives much more scope for human error.
Final elements
Key to Fault Trees
Spurious trip fault trees
The Figure 11 : DT Spurious high-pressure trips again ignores systematic faults and considers only random hardware failures; the complexity does not look too bad but s/c to ground and o/c (the most common communications failures), power failures and either final element failing will all give spurious trips. Figure 11 : ET Spurious high-pressure trips is less complex than Figure  12 for the DT application. As for DT either final element failing will give a spurious trip, but for ET only s/c to power (the least common communications failure) will give spurious trips as normally failures of diagnostics and power will not cause spurious trips for an ET trip system.
Diagnostics and Reverse Acting Transmitters
When a system is required to trip on a low signal (e.g. low pressure), failure of the signal itself, say through a blown fuse or by cable open circuit damage will also lead to a low signal and fail safe trip operation on a de-energise to trip system. If, however the system is required to trip on a high signal (e.g. high-pressure) obtained from Feature: Energise or De-energise to trip? a transducer rather than a switch, failure of the signal itself will not automatically lead to a fail safe condition; the protection system will continue to think that as the signal is below the trip setting the system is healthy. In time past the recognised solution for this, to maintain the integrity of the de-energise to trip principle was to fit a reverse acting transmitter to the trip system; giving a low signal for a high process condition and a high signal for a low process condition. With today's range of equipment that includes diagnostics this is no longer necessary. Line monitoring of the input signals can be used to determine whether or not they are healthy and appropriate action or alarm initiated when an abnormal condition is detected. However the requirements for this to be implemented have to be included in the Safety Requirements Specification. Where diagnostics are provided then there must be a response to the action that is prompted or the diagnostics will be ineffective.
The facilities and "features" that are provided by automatic diagnostics add complexity to the overall system and should only be included where there is a definite need and benefit that can be fully defined. The "KISS" (Keep It Simple, Stupid) principle should still be applied to protective systems despite (or perhaps because of) the apparent flexibility and power of modern programmable systems. If a system can provide all the required protection using simple combinations of solid state logic (or indeed using relays), why make it more complex?
Modern "Smart" transmitters include a range of features to aid diagnostics and to facilitate easy maintenance, interrogation, and in particular range changing. When used in a protective system it is essential that any features that permit on-line changes to the transmitter are barred. Whether the overall system is de-energise or energise to trip, allowing on line changes may result in unexpected consequences. It is vital to avoid situations where diagnostics and communication links can be used to take unauthorised action e.g. through poorly engineered HART protocol or Fieldbus systems.
Conclusions
The choice of de-energise or energise to trip is less clear cut than at first sight. Coming from a background where de-energise to trip was the norm, we have recognised that there is clearly a need for both modes of trip operation. In deciding which one to use it is essential to take a holistic look at the protection functions that are being requested, not necessarily just the particular safety instrumented function under immediate consideration. Are there circumstances in the overall operation of the plant or equipment where one approach is preferable to the other?
Holistically includes ensuring that the failure modes are identified and that failure to safety is properly evaluated. Supply and design of utilities to service the trip system are as vital as the core Safety Instrumented Function (SIF) itself. Energise to trip is potentially more complex to design, requiring more attention to the reliability of the power supplies in particular, but the possibilities of getting the design wrong leading to a higher failure to danger rate are greater. Even nominally de-energise to trip systems can include what are effectively energise to trip elements that may go unrecognised where trip initiation on high measurement signals is required.
We also do think it is appropriate to point out the complexity issues and the care needed not just in design, but in requirements, implementation, operation and maintenance. Common cause failures often arise through complexity and can easily go unrecognised. It is not unknown for redundant power supply systems to be compromised in voting systems where the power distribution to similar components in all the voted loops is fed via a single MCB or fuse.
During the design phase it is important that everyone understands the potential complexities of the system and that these are properly communicated to those who will have to operate and maintain the system. Is the design brief fully documented so that it can be readily understood in 2 or 3 years time when all the design team have moved on to pastures new?
And finally we must recognise that the system may well be modified during its lifetime and complexity is a major issue for modifications! Ambiguity and inconsistency in information and poor traceability are also serious issues that emerge when the design is revisited some time later to implement a modification.
So an independent assessor at a preliminary FSA when asked by the client, "As we are concerned about spurious trips, would 'energise to trip' be acceptable and under what conditions?", should show all the usual reluctance to answer leading questions and get involved in the design! But the assessor should point out that it is no good looking at the trip/protection system alone. A wider (holistic) view is needed. "It depends" is the initial valid response
